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PEELING BACK THE ONION OF CYBER ESPIONAGE 
AFTER TALLINN 2.0 
COLONEL DAVID A. WALLACE,∗ AMY H. MCCARTHY,∗∗ 
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK VISGER∗∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Tallinn 2.0 represents an important advancement in the under-
standing of international law’s application to cyber operations be-
low the threshold of force.  Its provisions on cyber espionage will 
be instrumental to states in grappling with complex legal problems 
in the area of digital spying.  The law of cyber espionage as out-
lined by Tallinn 2.0, however, is substantially based on rules that 
have evolved outside of the digital context, and there exist serious 
ambiguities and limitations in its framework.  This Article will ex-
plore gaps in the legal structure and consider future options avail-
able to states in light of this underlying mismatch.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cyber espionage is unquestionably one of the most persistent and per-
plexing economic and security problems in the world today.  It has and will 
continue to be a major source of friction between states into the foreseeable 
future.1  While many nations have suffered data breaches resulting in serious 
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 1.  See, e.g., COLLIN ANDERSON & KARIM SADJADPOUR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L 
PEACE, IRAN’S CYBER THREAT: ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, AND REVENGE 6 (2018), http://carne-
gieendowment.org/files/Iran_Cyber_Final_Full_v2.pdf (detailing Iran’s efforts in this arena); Tim 
Johnson, Small Nations Join Hacking Game—and This Mideast One Got Big Results, MCCLATCHY 
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ramifications from instances of digital espionage, most also quietly continue 
to engage in cyber spying as an integral part of national security efforts.2  The 
interests of some states, however, are not limited to conventional political 
and military secrets.  Private entities have also emerged as important players 
in this traditionally state-dominated activity.3  Capabilities associated with 
cyber technology have changed the landscape in trade secret and proprietary 
data theft against states and private industry, creating serious financial perils 
for victims and threats of national economic destabilization.4 
From the U.S. government perspective, cyber espionage has come to 
represent not only a serious external national security and economic threat, 
but a diplomatic and domestic public relations minefield.  China has gained 
substantial military advantages in recent years by stealing information on 
some of the most advanced weapons systems in the American arsenal, in-
cluding jet fighters and unmanned submersible vehicles.5  In addition to the 
exposure of military secrets, the theft of intellectual property has also posed 
a threat to the country’s economic health and defense strategy.  Commenting 
on the impacts of economic cyber espionage specifically, a senior Depart-
ment of Justice official in the Obama Administration observed: 
 This is a serious threat to our national security.  I mean, our econ-
omy depends on the ability to innovate.  And if there’s a dedicated 
nation state who’s using its intelligence apparatus to steal day in 
                                                          
DC BUREAU (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-
security/article196090329.html (describing a long-term cyber espionage campaign by Lebanon 
against companies and individuals from twenty-one countries); Mariarosaria Taddeo, Opinion, Qa-
tar Crisis: Lessons to Learn in the Age of Cyber Attacks, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2017), 
http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-crisis-lessons-learn-age-cyber-attacks-640446 (citing the hack of 
the Qatar News Agency and resulting friction between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, among 
other recent instances). 
 2.  See Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 
19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1096–98 (2004); see also Seymour M. Hersh, The Online Threat: 
Should We Be Worried About a Cyber War?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 1, 2010), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/01/the-online-threat (describing the “EP-3E” inci-
dent as an example of China’s interest and capability in the area of cyber espionage).   
 3.  See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 
291, 293 (2015) (discussing the rise of foreign surveillance on individuals); see also Johan Sigholm, 
Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations, 4 J. MIL. STUD. 1 (2013) (exploring the expanding role 
of non-state actors in offensive cyber activities).   
 4.  See Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage Under 
International Law, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 443, 459–73 (2014).  Domestic corporate vic-
tims of cyber espionage include Coca-Cola, Lockheed Martin, Adobe, Google, and many others.  
Id. at 454.   
 5.  U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 114TH CONG., ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 
302 (2016), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2016%20Annual%20Re-
port%20to%20Congress.pdf. 
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and day out what we’re trying to develop, that poses a serious 
threat to our country.6 
In 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) was the subject 
of a cyber-espionage operation by Chinese hackers7 resulting in the release 
of the personal information of over twenty-two million people.8  In another 
troubling and highly-publicized episode, a team with links to the Russian 
government hacked into the Democratic National Committee computer sys-
tem in an effort to disrupt the 2016 U.S. presidential election.9  Reports of 
America’s own program of surveillance have also created ripples around the 
globe.  Working for an intelligence contractor, Edward Snowden copied and 
then leaked highly classified National Security Agency (“NSA”) information 
that revealed, among other things, various intrusive cyber espionage activi-
ties by the United States and its allies.10 
Despite an increased global awareness of the dangers of digital spying, 
international law currently does little to specifically address the practice.11  
In the absence of specific treaty provisions, international law is generally re-
active—reflecting state practice that over time hardens into customary law.  
It is not surprising, then, that the international legal framework lags behind 
the pace of change in cyberspace.  The governing legal framework for digital 
spying, in fact, evolved in the absence of modern digital capabilities.  With 
cyber espionage showing no sign of abating, it is important to not only un-
derstand the current state of international law, the lex lata, regarding digital 
espionage, but also to recognize the gaps, ambiguities, and limitations in the 
                                                          
 6.  James Billington, China’s ‘Great Brain Robbery’ Hacking of U.S. Companies a National 
Security Emergency, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinas-great-
brain-robbery-hacking-us-companies-national-security-emergency-1538590. 
 7.  Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Government Has Arrested Hackers It Says Breached OPM Da-
tabase, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chi-
nese-government-has-arrested-hackers-suspected-of-breaching-opm-data-
base/2015/12/02/0295b918-990c-11e5-8917-
653b65c809eb_story.html?utm_term=.03db1e4a7150.  It was unclear what, if any, relationship the 
hackers had to the Chinese government.  Id.  
 8.  Kevin Murnane, Cyber Security: The World’s Best and Worst Presented with a Well-De-
signed Infographic, FORBES (May 4, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kev-
inmurnane/2017/05/04/cyber-security-the-worlds-best-and-worst-presented-with-a-well-designed-
infographic/#322335554416. 
 9.  Eric Lipton et al., The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-
dnc.html. 
 10.  Paul Szoldra, This Is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of Unprecedented 
Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-
timeline-2016-9.  Snowden’s disclosures resulted in international as well as domestic condemnation 
of the United States’ cyber activities.  See, e.g., The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, SPIEGEL (Oct. 
27, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-
cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html. 
 11.  See infra Parts III, IV.   
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current legal architecture.  Also important is a consideration of the road 
ahead, the lex ferenda, as the law evolves to fit this new digital context. 
Fortunately for government and military officials, policy makers, legal 
advisers, academics, and others interested in cyber law and policy, the 2017 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Opera-
tions12 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0” or “Tallinn 2.0”) is a foundational starting 
point for such an analysis.  Tallinn Manual 2.0 addresses several controver-
sial legal matters surrounding cyber espionage as well as many other vital 
issues spanning public international law.  By way of background and context, 
in 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence (“NATO CCD COE”), a renowned cyber research and 
training institution in Tallinn, Estonia, invited an independent group of ex-
perts to compile a manual on the international law governing cyber warfare.13  
This effort brought together a group of international law scholars and practi-
tioners—the International Group of Experts (“Experts”)—to explore and ar-
ticulate how extant legal norms apply to cyber warfare.14  The original Tal-
linn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare15 was 
published in 2013.  As a result of the success of the first Tallinn Manual, the 
NATO CCD COE launched a follow-on initiative to expand the scope of 
coverage, with the updated Manual to include international law governing 
cyber operations during peacetime.  The reason for the new initiative by the 
NATO CCD COE was to respond to the realities of what was actually hap-
pening in cyberspace.  That is, states were dealing with cyber issues below 
the use of force threshold on a frequent basis.16 
The NATO CCD COE thus convened a second group of Experts, and 
their efforts led to the publication of Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 2017.  The greatly 
expanded Manual not only incorporates and updates the materials on cyber 
warfare from the first publication, but also includes coverage of legal regimes 
implicated by peacetime cyber activities.17  Tallinn Manual 2.0 contains 154 
                                                          
 12.  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN 2.0]. 
 13.  Id. at 1.   
 14.  Id.  
 15.  TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Mi-
chael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
 16.  See Tallinn Manual 2.0, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, 
https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn-manual/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
 17.  Id.  Recent scholarship has explored Tallinn 2.0’s impact on areas involving sovereignty, 
state attribution, and international human rights law.  See generally William Banks, State Respon-
sibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions After Tallinn 2.0, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1493 (2017); 
Robert E. Barnsby & Shane R. Reeves, Give Them an Inch, They’ll Take a Terabyte: How States 
May Interpret Tallinn Manual 2.0’s International Human Rights Law Chapter, 95 TEX. L. REV. 
1515, 1516 (2017); Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 
TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1640–41 (2017).  Not surprisingly, Tallinn 2.0 has generated a great deal of 
discussion and debate and, in some cases, disagreement about how international legal norms apply 
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rules, including two specific rules on cyber espionage—one for peacetime 
and the other for armed conflict.18  These rules reflect the Experts’ determi-
nations as to the current lex lata within the area of cyber operations.  The 
commentary accompanying each rule not only provides some valuable in-
sights into the deliberations of the Experts in terms of the legal basis for the 
rules and their normative context, but also offers practical implications of 
their application in a cyber environment.19  Additionally, the commentaries 
to the rules articulate, in some depth, the various positions taken by the Ex-
perts in their discussions, including the relative consensus they could reach 
on a particular issue.  This is helpful “[a]s neither treaty application nor [s]tate 
practice is well developed” with respect to cyber operations generally, or 
cyber espionage specifically.20 
This Article will examine the legal landscape of cyber espionage under 
international law as delineated by Tallinn 2.0.  First, the Article will explore 
the historical and legal evolution of digital spying.21  The Article will then 
examine Tallinn 2.0’s specific rules pertaining to the practice.22  Next, the 
Article will discuss the normative gaps, ambiguities, and limitations of the 
current state of the law, including an exploration of the international legal 
norms that directly and indirectly govern cyber espionage.23  Finally, the Ar-
ticle will offer some thoughts on the lex ferenda for cyber espionage, both in 
peace and wartime, in light of current developments.24  Significantly, the Ar-
ticle will evaluate whether the applicable international legal norms are ade-
quate to regulate the pervasive and detrimental problem of digital spying for 
states and, by extension, commercial interests, and individuals. 
II.  CYBER ESPIONAGE: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Espionage has a multitude of definitions.  Popularly, it is defined as “the 
practice of spying or using spies to obtain information about the plans and 
                                                          
to cyberspace and operations.  Compare Gary Corn, Tallinn Manual 2.0—Advancing the Conver-
sation, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-ad-
vancing-conversation/#more-37812 (adopting the opinion that sovereignty is a foundational princi-
ple for the international norms on the prohibition on the use of force and the rule of non-
intervention), with Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 735, 740–41 (2017) (positing that “sovereignty is a principle that depends on the domain 
and the practical imperatives of states and is subject to adjustment in interstate application”).  This 
Article will focus exclusively on Tallinn 2.0’s treatment of cyber espionage.   
 18.  TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 168–74 (Rule 32), 409–12 (Rule 89).   
 19.  See, e.g., id at 11–29 (discussing the issue of state sovereignty in the context of cyber op-
erations).   
 20.  Id. at 4. 
 21.  See infra Part II.  
 22.  See infra Part III.  
 23.  See infra Part IV. 
 24.  See infra Part V.  
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activities especially of a foreign government or a competing company.”25  Put 
in a slightly different context, espionage includes, among other things, a 
state’s efforts to clandestinely acquire classified or otherwise protected infor-
mation from a targeted state or from entities or individuals within the targeted 
state.26  If knowledge is power, it is hardly surprising that states seek to obtain 
intelligence from and about each other.  In the most traditional sense of spy-
ing, a state or one of its organs dispatches an agent into another state on a 
mission to access and obtain protected intelligence.27 
A.  Historical Evolution 
Espionage, for whatever purpose, is not new. Some have even said it is 
the world’s second oldest profession.28  Antiquity is replete with stories of 
spies.  The earliest known surviving record of espionage dates from the war 
between Pharaoh Ramses with the Hittites and the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 
B.C.29  The tools of the spy trade have undergone a staggering transformation 
over the course of human history.  As technology has developed and pro-
gressed, astoundingly complex and creative means for carrying out espionage 
have been devised.30  For example, around 500 B.C., the Spartans invented 
the skytale, a device composed of rods and papyrus designed to transport 
hidden messages.31  In the Middle Ages, the Italian painter and polymath 
Leon Battista Alberti invented one of the first known mechanical devices for 
encoding messages—a cipher wheel.32  A more sophisticated version of Al-
berti’s cipher wheel was still being used during the American Civil War.33 
                                                          
 25.  Espionage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/espio-
nage (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
 26.  David P. Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: Controversies Involv-
ing Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets through Cyber Technologies, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS 
(2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/10/economic-cyber-espionage-and-interna-
tional-law-controversies-involving. 
 27.  Russell Buchan, The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage, 
in INTERNATIONAL CYBER NORMS: LEGAL, POLICY & INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 65–66 (Anna Ma-
ria Osula & Henry Rõigas eds., 2016).  
 28.  Paul Reynolds, The World’s Second Oldest Profession, BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3490120.stm. 
 29.  Steven M. Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. The Problem of Torture, 43 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2009).   
 30.  Leah Hoffmann, The Evolution of Spy Tools, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2006), 
https://www.forbes.com/2006/04/15/intelligence-spying-gadgets_cx_lh_06slate_0418tools.html.  
 31.  More descriptively:  
Skytales were long, slender rods which had been wrapped with a thin strip of papyrus, 
leather, or parchment. A message was written on the wrapping, and then the strip was 
unwound and passed on to a messenger (who often wore it as a belt).  Only when it was 
rewound around a rod of the same diameter could the original message be deciphered.  
Id.   
 32.  Id.   
 33.  Id.  
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The 20th Century also saw some interesting gadgets used for spying.  
For example, during World War I, the German military used pigeons outfitted 
with cameras to photograph troops and fortifications.34  Upon return, intelli-
gence officers then studied the aerial photos to gain information about enemy 
troop numbers, locations, and weapons.35  The photographs also facilitated 
the creation of more precise topographical maps.36  During World War II, 
brilliant allied mathematicians and engineers constructed a device that ena-
bled intelligence officers to break the codes of the sophisticated German Lo-
renz SZ-40 cipher machine.37  Nicknamed “Colossus,” it is now considered 
the world’s first fixed-program, digital, electronic, computer.38 
In the aftermath of World War II, during the cloak and dagger drama of 
the Cold War, states leveraged technological innovations to further their es-
pionage efforts.  These advancements include everything from miniaturized 
cameras and shoe heel transmitters to high altitude U-2 spy planes, such as 
the one flown by Francis Gary Powers when he was shot down by the Soviet 
Union in 1960.39 
In more recent years, technology has transformed and revolutionized 
methods of espionage.  An explosion of technological advancements has led 
to the development of such platforms and capabilities as unmanned surveil-
lance drones, highly sophisticated and classified spy satellites and, of course, 
computers, related information technology, and data-gathering techniques.  
In one of the earliest cases of cyber espionage, West German officials dis-
covered a Soviet-backed spy ring had gained access to dozens of U.S. mili-
tary computers during the late 1980s.40  Incidents of cyber espionage have 
risen exponentially along with the ubiquitous use of computer technology.41 
                                                          
 34.  Dan Schlenoff, Aerial Spying, 100 Years Before Drones, SCI. AM.: ANECDOTES FROM THE 
ARCHIVE (Oct. 10, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-archive/aerial-
spying-100-years-before-drones/. 
 35.  Id.   
 36.  Id.   
 37.  Colossus, CRYPTO MUSEUM, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/colossus/index.htm 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2017). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Michael Dobbs, Gary Powers Kept a Secret Diary with Him After He Was Captured by the 
Soviets, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-insti-
tution/gary-powers-secret-diary-soviet-capture-180956939/.  Powers was sentenced to ten years in 
prison by Russia for his admitted espionage but was released early in a prisoner exchange.  A Look 
Back. . . The Cold War: Strangers on a Bridge, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Feb. 20, 2009), 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/strangers-on-a-bridge.html. 
 40.  John Markoff, West Germans Raid Spy Ring That Violated U.S. Computers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 3, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/03/world/west-germans-raid-spy-ring-that-vio-
lated-us-computers.html. 
 41.  For a comprehensive examination of the extent of foreign economic espionage occurring 
in recent years with the aid of computer technology, see generally NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
AND SEC. CTR., FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN CYBERSPACE (2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf.   
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Today, disturbing accounts of widespread cyber espionage activities, 
such as exfiltration, monitoring, and theft of digital information, dominate 
media reports.42  No longer limited by geographical barriers, risk of capture, 
and lack of linguistic and cultural expertise, modern cyber spies operate on a 
dramatically different landscape than traditional spies.  This shift has also 
opened the playing field to smaller states previously excluded from large-
scale intelligence activities, traditionally dominated by major world pow-
ers.43  For example, recent reports reveal the serious threat posed by North 
Korean-linked cyber spies against multiple countries including the United 
States, South Korea, and various Middle Eastern nations.44 
B.  The Rise of Economic Espionage 
State espionage has not been limited to the collection of military, polit-
ical, or national security secrets.  A historical analysis shows that nations 
have also engaged in widespread economic-based surveillance of foreign 
states and businesses—stealing trade secrets, intellectual property, and other 
proprietary data for the benefit of governments and private firms since at least 
the Cold War.45  Economic espionage, sometimes also termed industrial or 
commercial espionage, has resulted in unfair business advantages for nations 
conducting these activities and enormous economic losses for state, institu-
tional, and individual victims.46 
                                                          
 42.  See, e.g., Ryan Lucas, U.S. Charges Alleged Chinese Government Spy with Stealing U.S. 
Trade Secrets, NPR (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/10/656280811/u-s-charges-al-
leged-chinese-government-spy-with-stealing-u-s-trade-secrets (reporting on the charges filed 
against a Chinese intelligence officer for economic espionage); Bruce Schneier, What’s Next in 
Government Surveillance, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2015/03/whats-next-in-government-surveillance/385667/ (chronicling some modern in-
stances of state-sponsored hacking, exfiltration, and espionage).   
 43.  See Mark Galeotti, Size Doesn’t Matter for Spies Anymore, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 31, 
2018), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/31/size-doesnt-matter-for-spies-anymore/ (discussing the 
robust espionage capabilities of Dutch spies, specifically).   
 44.  See Eric Auchard, Lesser-Known North Korea Cyber-Spy Group Goes International: Re-
port, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber/lesser-known-
north-korea-cyber-spy-group-goes-international-report-idUSKCN1G42CH.   
 45.  See Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 444, 459–70 (explaining the dramatic rise in economic es-
pionage as nations came to appreciate the significant role of financial stability in the maintenance 
of national power in the aftermath of the USSR’s dissolution).   
 46.  See id. (discussing the impact of economic espionage from the Cold War to modern day).  
Economic espionage has been defined in various ways.  According to the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation: 
Economic espionage is foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity di-
rected at the U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons, designed 
to unlawfully or clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions or to unlaw-
fully obtain sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary eco-
nomic information; or critical technologies.  This theft, through open and clandestine 
methods, can provide foreign entities with vital proprietary economic information at a 
fraction of the true cost of its research and development, causing significant economic 
losses.   
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The United States has publicly refused to take part in intelligence gath-
ering for the benefit of private businesses since the 1970s.47  In the wake of 
the Edward Snowden revelations, the White House reaffirmed its commit-
ment to this principle.48  Based on statements from former government offi-
cials within the past few years, the U.S. position on economic espionage ap-
pears to be relatively unique.49  The French government, for example, has 
been breaking into hotel rooms of foreign business travelers and download-
ing the contents of their personal computers for the competitive advantage of 
French companies for years.50  Although the American government has con-
sistently affirmed that it does not conduct commercial espionage to benefit 
domestic companies, it is important to note that it does not deny that it col-
lects economic information for its own use.51 
                                                          
What Is “Economic Espionage”?, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-economic-espionage (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).   
 47.  Samuel J. Rascoff, The Norm Against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private 
Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 252 (2016).  The President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) under President Nixon was of the opinion that such sharing 
of information would be inappropriate and a conflict of interest.  Id. (first citing JOHN J. FIALKA, 
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 7 (1997); then citing The Threat of 
Foreign Economic Espionage to U. S. Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcom. on Economic 
and Commercial Law of the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 18 (1992) (statement of 
Gerard S. Burke)).   
 48.  Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive on Signals Intelli-
gence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities.  According to this di-
rective: 
The collection of foreign private commercial information or trade secrets is authorized 
only to protect the national security of the United States or its partners and allies.  It is 
not an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to collect such in-
formation to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors 
commercially.   
Id. (footnote omitted).  Some limited exceptions do apply, however.  The government may share 
specific information with a private firm, for example, indicating that the business is the victim of an 
offensive cyber operation.  See Rascoff, supra note 47, at 257.  Additionally, information regarding 
the involvement of foreign officials with suspect business transactions, including instances of brib-
ery, may be conveyed to firms.  Id.   
 49.  Former CIA director Michael Hayden claimed that only four other countries followed 
this American norm.  Michael Hayden Says U.S. Is Easy Prey for Hackers; Former CIA and NSA 
Chief Says ‘Shame on Us’ For Not Protecting Critical Information Better, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-hayden-says-u-s-is-easy-prey-for-hackers-
1434924058.  This short list is most likely comprised of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand.  Rascoff, supra note 47, at 256 & n.45 (citing Margaret Warner, An Exclusive 
Club: The Five Countries That Don’t Spy on Each Other, PBS (Oct. 25, 2013), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/an-exclusive-club-the-five-countries-that-dont-spy-on-each-
other).   
 50.  Philip Ewing, Gates: French Cyber Spies Target U.S., POLITICO (May 22, 2014), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/france-intellectual-property-theft-107020.   
 51.  See Jack Goldsmith, The Precise (and Narrow) Limits on U.S. Economic Espionage, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 23, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/precise-and-narrow-limits-us-
economic-espionage (positing that U.S. practice does allow for economic espionage on foreign 
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Despite its own position, the United States has suffered the impacts of 
foreign economic espionage from a variety of governments over time, involv-
ing South Korea, Japan, France, Russia, Israel, China, and Germany.52  China 
is a notable example.  Chinese economic espionage is on an almost unfath-
omable industrial scale.  Although exact figures are unknowable, the Com-
mission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that the 
theft of American intellectual property totals approximately $300 billion an-
nually, with fifty to eighty percent of that resulting from China.53  China’s 
long-running campaign to steal valuable information and data from compa-
nies and government agencies includes the work of at least one unit from the 
People’s Liberation Army—Unit 61398—as well as other highly effective 
government-sponsored cyber espionage organizations.54  In his statement be-
fore the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 11, 2017, the Di-
rector of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, stated that Beijing would likely 
continue to actively target the U.S. government, its allies, and American com-
panies with cyber espionage operations.55 
The intersection of the advancement of cyber capabilities and concur-
rent rise in economic espionage is particularly significant.  As described by 
retired U.S. Army General Keith Alexander, the former Director of the NSA 
and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, “The loss of industrial infor-
mation and intellectual property through cyber espionage constitutes the 
‘greatest transfer of wealth in history.’”56  Problematically for most states, 
national governments generally lack control over the private digital networks 
and infrastructure subject to foreign economic espionage efforts.57  This has 
                                                          
states and companies, and even theft of trade secrets, but does not allow the information to be passed 
along to U.S. firms).   
 52.  Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 468 (citing JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 5 (1997)).   
 53.  Adam Segal, How China Is Preparing for Cyberwar, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 20, 
2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2017/0320/How-China-is-
preparing-for-cyberwar. 
 54.  Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, FBI Warns Industry of Chinese Cyber Campaign, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-warns-
industry-of-chinese-cyber-campaign/2014/10/15/0349a00a-54b0-11e4-ba4b-
f6333e2c0453_story.html?utm_term=.3a4eb16c5ed4. 
 55.  Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 6–
7 (2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence). 
 56.  Randolph Kahn, Economic Espionage in 2017 and Beyond: 10 Shocking Ways They Are 
Stealing Your Intellectual Property and Corporate Mojo, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/05/05_kahn/. 
 57.  In addition to maintaining security over Department of Defense networks, one of the inter-
ests of U.S. Cyber Command is coordinating with the private sector in ensuring digital security.  See 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD CYBER STRATEGY 7 (2015), http://archive.defense.gov/home/fea-
tures/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf.  The report also 
stated, “The United States government has a limited and specific role to play in defending the nation 
against cyberattacks of significant consequence.  The private sector owns and operates over ninety 
percent of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace and is thus the first line of defense.”  
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been exacerbated further with the rise of cloud computing.58  Where nations 
have historically maintained control over domestic borders and pertinent 
governmental assets, thereby mitigating the risk of traditional forms of intel-
ligence gathering, this balance of control has been upset in the industrial 
cyber realm. 
C.  Methods and Characteristics of Cyber Espionage 
As discussed below, the method used to accomplish an act of espionage 
is determinative in any legal analysis.59  It is important, therefore, to briefly 
consider the varieties and characteristics of digital espionage operations.  As 
a starting point, most acts of cyber spying could be fairly characterized as 
computer network “exploitation” rather than as an “attack,” as the aim is the 
collection of information rather than the destruction or degradation of digital 
capabilities.60  Cyber espionage is one type of cyber intrusion. A helpful de-
scription of cyber espionage is contained in the NATO volume Peacetime 
Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace.  It provides: 
[C]opying of data that is publicly not available and which is in 
wireless transmission, saved or temporarily available on IT-
systems or computer networks located on the territory or area un-
der the exclusive jurisdiction of another [s]tate by a [s]tate organ, 
agent, or otherwise attributable to a [s]tate, conducted secretly, un-
der disguise or false pretences, and without the (presumed) consent 
or approval of the owners or operators of the targeted IT-systems 
or computer networks or of the territorial [s]tate.  Copying includes 
also the temporary copying of data into the random access or vir-
tual memory of an IT-system for the purpose of mere visualization 
or acoustic exemplification of ([for example], voice over IP) data.61 
In some important respects, cyber espionage is in a category by itself 
with regard to its characteristics and capabilities.  First, cyber espionage has 
virtually unlimited reach given that a digital operation can be launched from 
and target almost anywhere in the world.  Second, with the development and 
                                                          
Id. at 5.  U.S. Cyber Command considers national economic security as a major cyber concern for 
the future.  Id. at 2. 
 58.  See J. Nicholas Hoover, Compliance in the Ether: Cloud Computing, Data Security and 
Business Regulation, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255, 260–62 (2013) (describing the security perils of 
cloud computing).   
 59.  See infra Part IV. 
 60.  See HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 156 (2012); 
see also Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 829 (2012).   
 61.  Katharina Ziolkowski, Peacetime Cyber Espionage—New Tendencies in Public Interna-
tional Law, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 429 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013). 
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evolution of the “internet of things” in which all things in societies are con-
nected via data networks,62 cyber espionage poses broad risks to human in-
frastructure.  Third, it is also extraordinarily difficult to defend against.  Hun-
dreds of billions of dollars have been spent by states, businesses, and 
individuals on software, services, and hardware to prevent and mitigate the 
effects of cyber espionage.63  Emerging technologies facilitate access to vo-
luminous information and the ability to download it at an incredible speed.64  
Finally, one of the true Gordian knots of cyber operations generally, and 
cyber espionage specifically, is the difficulty of attribution.  The attribution 
of cyber activities carried out through the internet is extraordinarily problem-
atic and, in many cases, impossible to achieve.65  Given these capabilities and 
characteristics of operating in cyberspace, it is no surprise that cyber espio-
nage is a particularly attractive and effective method to acquire information.  
Of course, it is axiomatic that technology, by its very nature, develops more 
quickly than do most laws that regulate its use.  This is certainly true with 
international law and cyber espionage.  In fact, cyber espionage poses signif-
icant challenges to the legal framework governing traditional espionage prac-
tices. 
D.  Traditional Legal Framework 
As background, it is important to understand the legal status of tradi-
tional forms of espionage, both in times of peace and of conflict.  As a thresh-
old matter, the international legality of state conduct is articulated in the 1927 
landmark Permanent Court of International Justice opinion in the Lotus 
case.66  According to that decision, states have significant discretion, limited 
only in certain cases by prohibitive rules and, in the absence of such rules, a 
                                                          
 62.  See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’ FORBES (May 13, 
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-
that-anyone-can-understand/#7d48b45f1d09.   
 63.  David J. Kappos & Pamela Passman, Cyber Espionage Is Reaching Crisis Levels, 
FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/12/cybersecruity-amsc-cyber-espionage/.  
 64.  Consider the statement of a senior U.S. government source: “A spy might once have been 
able to take out a few books’ worth of material . . . .  Now they take the whole library.  And if you 
restock the shelves, they will steal it again.”  Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST (July 
1, 2010), https://www.economist.com/node/16478792.   
 65.  See generally Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attrib-
ution, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 229 (2012) (examining the issues endemic to cyber operation at-
tribution).  
 66.  S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18–19 (Sept. 7).  The 
court held: 
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a [s]tate is 
that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its 
power in any form in the territory of another [s]tate.  In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a [s]tate outside its territory except by virtue of a 
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. 
Id.   
 2019] CYBER ESPIONAGE AFTER TALLINN 2.0 217 
state is free to adopt the principles that it believes are best and most suitable 
to its interests.67 
1.  In Peacetime 
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the legal status of traditional foreign 
espionage during peacetime.  International law is virtually silent on this is-
sue.68  The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does grant immunity 
to a foreign diplomatic official discovered to be involved in espionage activ-
ities.69  Such person will generally be deemed a persona non grata70 and re-
moved from the host state.71  Aside from this limited circumstance, however, 
significant legal ambiguity exists in the area of peacetime espionage.  Alt-
hough there is some disagreement in the literature,72 the scholarly consensus 
appears to be that the practice is either not illegal or it is affirmatively legal 
under international law.73  Simply put, no international treaty specifically 
prohibits espionage, and there exists a long-established and widespread state 
practice of employing spies.  The lack of mutual agreements in this area is 
not surprising, however.  Nations have strong national security and political 
justifications for spying.74  States are understandably reluctant to reveal their 
own capabilities and methods in foreign intelligence gathering, and bilateral 
or multilateral discussions on this issue may necessitate disclosing such in-
formation.75  Even if specific terms could be agreed upon, espionage is inev-
                                                          
 67.  Buchan, supra note 27, at 67–68. 
 68.  See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 601–03 (2007).  According to one scholar, “[T]raditional international law 
is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of espionage.  Leading treatises overlook espio-
nage altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy and describes his hapless fate 
upon capture.”  Id. at 602 (alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Falk, Foreward to ESSAYS ON 
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962)).   
 69.  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 31, ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
500 U.N.T.S. 95.   
 70.  Literally, “unwelcome” or “unacceptable” person.  See Ben Zimmer, “Persona non grata”: 
The Diplomatic Way to Say ‘You’re Unwelcome, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/persona-non-grata-the-diplomatic-way-to-say-youre-unwelcome-
1483631639 (explaining this term in the context of diplomatic relations).   
 71. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 69, art. 9, ¶ 1; see Lotrionte, supra 
note 4, at 460–61 (noting American and Russian instances of this practice from the Cold War). 
 72.  Scholars have taken the varying views that peacetime espionage is legal, illegal, or in a 
gray area between the two.  Radsan, supra note 68, at 602–06.   
 73.  See Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International 
Law, 102 VA. L. REV. 599, 608 (2016); see also Darien Pun, Comment, Rethinking Espionage in 
the Modern Era, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 360–61 (2017) (exploring the tolerability of this uncer-
tainty in the modern day).   
 74.  See, e.g., Arthur S. Hulnick & Daniel W. Mattausch, Ethics and Morality in United States 
Secret Intelligence, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 515 (1989) (arguing that foreign intelligence 
gathering fits within a state’s general obligation to protect citizens).   
 75.  Deeks, supra note 3, at 314.   
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itably cloaked in secrecy, and violations of such agreements would be diffi-
cult to detect.76  In other words, states would lack adequate assurances that 
legal agreements would be effective and domestically beneficial. 
Despite the paucity of substantive prohibitions of espionage in interna-
tional law, states themselves have long criminalized espionage under their 
own domestic laws.77  Foreign spies are subject to apprehension, prosecution, 
and perhaps execution if discovered.78  This arrangement creates a strange 
legal duality: Although spying is criminally proscribed by domestic law if 
conducted within and against the host country, the state itself engages in the 
same practice with its own intelligence assets around the globe.79  This frame-
work of risk is one that virtually all states are willing to accept.  Indeed, al-
most every developed country in the world engages in foreign intelligence 
gathering.80  In a practical sense, spying during peacetime may be seen as a 
responsible state tradition aimed at maintaining vital national interests and 
curbing potential external threats.81  Espionage may also serve to facilitate a 
reduction in friction between states in international relations.82  Nations have 
been operating in these legally uncertain waters for many years.83 
2.  During Conflict 
In contrast to peacetime espionage, several treaty provisions govern the 
international legal framework regarding spying during wartime.84  The first 
                                                          
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 461 (noting that although states may prosecute and imprison 
spies under their own domestic law, it has been a frequent historical practice for states to exchange 
captured spies with opposing states).   
 78.  See the case of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for example.  Rosenberg v. United States, 346 
U.S. 273 (1953).  For a thorough exploration of that trial, see Atossa M. Alavi, The Government 
Against Two: Ethel and Julius Rosenberg’s Trial, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 (2003).   
 79.  See, e.g., Radsan, supra note 68, at 618–19.   
 80.  Id. at 613.   
 81.  Id.   
 82.  Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 445.   
 83.  See Deeks, supra note 3, at 313–15 (discussing the relative “agnosticism” of states in the 
area of espionage under international law). 
 84.  A condition precedent to the application of the law of armed conflict is, not surprisingly, 
an armed conflict.  The law of armed conflict classifies armed conflicts into two types, namely: 
international and non-international armed conflicts.  As a matter of law, no other type of armed 
conflict exists.  The criteria for an international armed conflict, which is derived from Common 
Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, involves two or more sovereign states using armed force 
against each other regardless of the reasons or the intensity of the confrontation.  See Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.  Under the plain language 
of Common Article 2, a declaration of war and an occupation, partial or total, can also trigger the 
application of the entirety of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Id. art. 2.  Conversely, non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, as delineated by Common Article 3, are between governmental forces and 
non-governmental armed groups, or between such groups only.  Id. art. 3; see Int’l Comm. of the 
Red Cross [ICRC], How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian 
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treaty governing spies in wartime is Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex, Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907)—the Hague Relations.85  It has 
three relevant articles: 
 
ARTICLE 29. 
 A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely 
or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain infor-
mation in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention 
of communicating it to the hostile party. 
 Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into 
the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of ob-
taining information, are not considered spies.  Similarly, the fol-
lowing are not considered spies: Soldiers and civilians, carrying 
out their mission openly, intrusted with the delivery of despatches 
intended either for their own army or for the enemy’s army.  To 
this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose 
of carrying despatches and, generally, of maintaining communica-
tions between the different parts of an army or a territory. 
 
ARTICLE 30. 
 A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous 
trial. 
 
ARTICLE 31. 
 A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is sub-
sequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, 
and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.86 
 
Importantly, the concept of espionage in the context of an armed conflict 
only applies to international armed conflicts—those occurring between 
states.87  Taken together, and as supplemented and developed by Article 46 
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention,88 these provisions not 
                                                          
Law?, at 1–2, Opinion Paper (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-pa-
per-armed-conflict.pdf. 
 85.  Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV].   
 86.  Id. art. 29–31.   
 87.  TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410.  This is because neither the concept of combatant 
immunity nor the status of prisoner of war (as discussed below) pertains to non-international armed 
conflicts.  Id.   
 88.  Article 46 reaffirms the traditional rules on espionage in the Hague Relations with some 
variations.  Article 46 provides: 
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only define what it means for a member of the armed forces to engage in 
espionage, but also consequences of such conduct during an armed conflict. 
Article 31 of the Hague Relations is a unique and extraordinary provision in 
several respects.89  First, spying is a status issue, not a war crime.  If a member 
of the armed forces is captured while clandestinely engaging in the act of 
spying in the zone of operations of a belligerent, they do not retain the privi-
leges afforded to members of the armed forces and, instead, may be prose-
cuted and punished for spying.90  Under Article 31, a spy can regain their 
status as a prisoner of war (“POW”) and receive prosecutorial immunity if—
after escape from capture—they are able to rejoin their army.91  By compar-
ison, there exists no similar dispensation for civilians.92  That is, the civilian 
remains subject to trial and punishment under the domestic criminal laws of 
the targeted state upon capture. Additionally, if a civilian engages in espio-
nage during an armed conflict, they may be considered to be taking a direct 
part in hostilities, thereby jeopardizing their protected status as a civilian un-
der the law of armed conflict and making that person targetable during the 
period of participation.93 
                                                          
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this Protocol, any mem-
ber of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse 
Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war 
and may be treated as a spy. 
2. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party 
and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information 
shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform 
of his armed forces. 
3. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is a resident of territory 
occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of the Party on which he depends, 
gathers or attempts to gather information of military value within that territory shall not 
be considered as engaging in espionage unless he does so through an act of false pretences 
or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Moreover, such a resident shall not lose his right 
to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured while 
engaging in espionage. 
4. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of territory 
occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that territory shall not 
lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is 
captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 46, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].   
 89.  Hague IV, supra note 85, art. 31. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 221 (2d ed. 2010). 
 93.  TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410.  
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As contemplated under international law, traditional forms of espionage 
involve “acting clandestinely or on false pretences” in the context of employ-
ing human resources behind enemy lines.94  It does not specifically address 
espionage conducted by other intelligence-gathering methods, such as the use 
of electronic devices, wiretapping, code breaking, and aerial or satellite pho-
tography.95  To put a finer point on the concept of “acting clandestinely,” the 
soldier must be engaged in activities undertaken secretly or secretively de-
signed to conceal the identity of persons involved or the fact that it had oc-
curred.96  By contrast, “on false pretences” has been interpreted to mean that 
certain conduct created the impression that the individual concerned was en-
titled to access the information in question.97  The most commonly envi-
sioned example of spying under the law of armed conflict is a member of the 
armed forces captured in civilian clothing, or in an enemy uniform, gathering 
intelligence behind enemy lines.98 
The above provisions show that the international community may con-
sider spying during wartime, like in peacetime, to be an accepted reality.  De-
spite the fact that espionage does not constitute a war crime, it is still an ac-
tivity that is commonly criminally proscribed by states.99  A captured spy, 
whether soldier or civilian, may be prosecuted by the detaining military for 
violating an applicable law of the detaining force.100 
III.  CYBER ESPIONAGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND TALLINN 2.0 
Mirroring the legal framework addressed in the previous section, Tal-
linn Manual 2.0 also articulates two distinct rules covering cyber espio-
nage—one for peacetime and the other for armed conflict. 
A.  In Peacetime 
Under Rule 32 of Tallinn 2.0, peacetime cyber espionage is defined as 
“any act undertaken clandestinely or under false pretences that uses cyber 
                                                          
 94.  See Hague IV, supra note 85, art. 29. 
 95.  See id.   
 96.  TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
IN WAR 240 (2d ed. 2016). 
 99.  For a comprehensive list of state practices regarding captured spies during armed conflict, 
see Practice Relating to Rule 107. Spies, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-data-
bases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule107_sectionb (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).   
 100.  In an early American example, British Major John Andre was sentenced to death by a U.S. 
military commission after being apprehended behind enemy lines in civilian clothes following his 
meeting with Benedict Arnold to arrange the defeat of West Point.  See John Andre: Case Officer, 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (May 8, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no3/html/v05i3a07p_0001.htm.  For a thorough review of espionage un-
der American military law, see David A. Anderson, Spying in Violation of Article 106, UCMJ: The 
Offense and the Constitutionality of its Mandatory Death Penalty, 127 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).   
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capabilities to gather, or attempt to gather, information.”101  The Experts enu-
merated a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct or activities that poten-
tially could involve cyber espionage: surveillance, monitoring, capturing, or 
exfiltrating electronically transmitted or stored communications, data, or 
other information.102  Importantly, the Experts included within the term 
“cyber espionage” actions that are directed at states and private businesses—
to specifically include industrial and economic espionage.103  In terms of its 
scope of applicability, Rule 32 is applied to states and those whose actions 
can be attributed to states.104 
The Tallinn 2.0 Experts’ bottom line legal analysis for peacetime cyber 
espionage is quite clear: “[P]eacetime cyber espionage by [s]tates does not 
per se violate international law, [although] the method by which it is carried 
out might do so.”105  Once examined more closely, this conclusion is an un-
surprising statement of existing law.  In neither cyber espionage nor tradi-
tional forms of espionage in peacetime are there specific international treaties 
that regulate this practice.106  The Experts did acknowledge that because 
cyber espionage has become so widespread and damaging, it has spurred a 
debate about whether a new customary international law norm prohibiting 
espionage has developed.107  In fact, the Experts could point to several facts 
which tended to indicate that such a norm might be developing.108  Ulti-
mately, however, the Experts concluded that there was insufficient state prac-
tice and opinio juris109 to support the conclusion that a norm prohibiting 
states from engaging in cyber espionage has emerged.110 
The Experts specifically left open the possibility that cyber espionage 
might violate international law in the way that it is conducted, however.111  
They indicated that certain methods of cyber espionage may violate princi-
ples of international law—particularly sovereignty and the prohibition 
                                                          
 101.  TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 168. 
 102.  Id.  The Experts were careful to caveat their definition and description of cyber espionage 
in peacetime.  More specifically, they cautioned that the term “cyber espionage” was proffered in 
the Tallinn Manual for the purpose of Rule 32 and had no independent legal significance.  Id.   
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.   
 105.  Id.   
 106.  Buchan, supra note 27, at 68; see infra Part IV (discussing treaties which may be adapted 
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against intervention, which is discussed in the following sections.112  In ad-
dition, the Experts were clear to note that stylizing a cyber operation as espi-
onage does not, thereby, render an otherwise illegal operation legal.113  In the 
commentary to Rule 32, they emphasized: 
[I]f an aspect of a cyber espionage operation is unlawful under in-
ternational law, it renders the cyber espionage unlawful.  By styl-
ing a cyber operation as a ‘cyber espionage operation’, a [s]tate 
cannot therefore claim that it is by definition lawful under interna-
tional law; its lawfulness depends on whether the way in which the 
operation is carried out violates any international law obligations 
that bind the [s]tate.114 
This construct creates a situation where the severity of damage caused 
by the espionage does not determine the legality of the act.115  Instead, the 
legal analysis centers upon whether the method of cyber espionage violates 
some other norm of international law.  In other words, it does not matter that 
a state purloined nuclear launch codes via cyber espionage, but if the spying 
state damages or destroys a computer in the process, then that state has vio-
lated the sovereignty of the target state.116  As another example, if a state uses 
the premises of a diplomatic post to conduct cyber espionage, that state may 
be in violation of international law—specifically the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.117 
B.  During Conflict 
The legal framework for cyber espionage in wartime, on the other hand, 
relies on the adaptation of rules found in the Geneva Conventions and Hague 
Relations.  The espionage provisions found in these two marquee law of 
armed conflict treaties reflect customary international law.118  Not surpris-
ingly, Tallinn 2.0 tracks these rules fairly closely.  Tallinn 2.0 Rule 89 pro-
vides, “A member of the armed forces who has engaged in cyber espionage 
in enemy-controlled territory loses the right to be a prisoner of war and may 
be treated as a spy if captured before rejoining the armed forces to which 
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[they] belong[].”119  In other words, such an individual is not treated as a 
member of the armed forces with associated POW treatment and immunity 
from prosecution as a combatant. 
As can be seen when compared with the relevant Geneva and Hague 
provisions, this Rule is based on the law regarding traditional spying in war-
time, which generally provides for immunity for a spy when the spy rejoins 
the armed forces but otherwise allows a spy to be subject to prosecution under 
domestic law if apprehended.120  The Experts were clear that, as applied to 
cyber espionage, “[t]his Rule is limited to situations in which the individual 
concerned engages in cyber espionage while in ‘enemy controlled terri-
tory.’”121  As a result, remote cyber operations are not subject to this Rule, as 
such cyber operators are not operating behind enemy lines and, accordingly, 
do not need to “rejoin” their armed force.  This Rule would then have very 
limited applicability to situations where a cyber operator was required to 
clandestinely travel into enemy territory to conduct the necessary opera-
tion—such as intercepting signal communication or physical delivery of a 
flash drive into an enemy system.122 
Much like peacetime cyber espionage, the Tallinn 2.0 Experts made 
clear that cyber spying is not a per se violation of the law of armed conflict, 
although it is subject to the body of law and may violate its provisions.123  
That is, the spy is neither a war criminal nor is the act of espionage a war 
crime as in the case of traditional methods of spying.124  Rule 89 merely con-
cerns the classification of detained personnel.  The collection of enemy intel-
ligence during armed conflicts is a long-recognized method of warfare, and 
this tradition applies equally to the cyber context.125 
IV.  CYBER ESPIONAGE: NORMATIVE GAPS, AMBIGUITIES, AND 
LIMITATIONS 
An examination of Tallinn 2.0’s treatment of cyber espionage reveals 
certain normative gaps, ambiguities, and limitations in the application of cus-
tomary law to digital spying.  The struggle to fit cyber espionage into tradi-
tional legal underpinnings is evident even from Tallinn 2.0’s foundational 
parameters.  Regarding peacetime espionage, for example, the Experts noted 
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that cyber espionage can be facilitated in each of the three layers of cyber-
space: physical, logical, and social.126  The physical layer includes the phys-
ical network components, such as hardware, cables, routers, servers, and so 
on.  The logical layer includes the connections between networked devices.  
Finally, the social layer includes all of the individuals and groups that are 
involved in cyber activities who are susceptible to social engineering at-
tacks.127  These descriptions used to define modes of cyber espionage in Tal-
linn 2.0 serve to underscore the differences between prototypical cyber espi-
onage and traditional espionage.128  In both, the critical work to conduct the 
cyber espionage can be completed without stepping foot in the targeted coun-
try.  While one can conceive of some instances of espionage that may require 
physical presence, most do not and a prudent cyber spy would take care to 
avoid such a scenario.129  Further limitations in Tallinn 2.0’s statement of the 
law become clear when considering the application of existing international 
legal limits on state behavior. 
After examining the current state of international law, the Tallinn 2.0 
Experts concluded that espionage, in peacetime or wartime, does not per se 
violate international law.130  That is, the fact that an operation is cyber espi-
onage does not render the operation illegal, but the way in which the opera-
tion is carried out may render it unlawful.  Tallinn 2.0 describes specific vi-
olations of international law that may be applicable to peacetime cyber 
espionage operations.131  As will be seen, the doctrines of sovereignty, non-
intervention, and protection of privacy may provide some substantive, albeit 
imprecisely defined, legal restrictions on state conduct in this field.  The is-
sues of non-state actors and the state duty of due diligence, as well as the 
specific issue of weaponized honeypots, also constitute important legal con-
siderations. 
A.  State Sovereignty 
In the case of peacetime espionage, the most likely international legal 
provision to be implicated is that of sovereignty.  A cornerstone of interna-
tional law, this precept protects nations from unwanted intrusions by foreign 
states.132  The protection of sovereignty is noted in Rule 4 of Tallinn 2.0, 
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which provides: “A [s]tate must not conduct cyber operations that violate the 
sovereignty of another [s]tate.”133  The Tallinn 2.0 Experts did not precisely 
delineate when a cyber operation would constitute a violation of sovereignty.  
At a minimum, a violation of sovereignty would occur “when one [s]tate’s 
cyber operation interferes with or usurps the inherently governmental func-
tions of another [s]tate.”134  In addition, sufficient “infringement upon the 
target [s]tate’s territorial integrity”135 would also qualify.  While the degree 
necessary to constitute a sufficient infringement upon territorial integrity was 
not specified, the Experts identified three levels of possible infringement: 
“(1) physical damage; (2) loss of functionality; and (3) infringement upon 
territorial integrity falling below the threshold of loss of functionality.”136 
One type of cyber espionage operation that might implicate sovereignty 
is the operation that physically takes place in the sovereign territory of the 
target nation.  The Experts were divided on whether such an operation vio-
lated sovereignty, but the majority believed that it did in fact violate the pre-
cept.137  For example, in a cyber espionage operation by an agent of one state 
that is physically present in the targeted state, the majority of Experts were 
of the view that such conduct would violate the principle of sovereignty.138  
The rationale is that if agents of one state are physically present in another 
state’s territory and conduct cyber operations without consent or other legal 
justification, the targeted state’s sovereignty has been violated by the former 
state.139  The minority, however, took the position that “extensive [s]tate 
practice of conducting espionage on [a] target [s]tate’s territory has created 
an exception to the generally accepted [view] that non-consensual activities 
attributable to a [s]tate while physically present on another[] [state’s] territory 
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violate[s] sovereignty.”140  Interestingly, the majority’s view indicates that 
they would consider most traditional methods of espionage to be violations 
of the doctrine of sovereignty, as they tended to occur within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the victim state.141 
The more relevant and pressing issue of remote cyber espionage simi-
larly caused cognitive dissonance for the Experts.  They could not achieve 
consensus on the issue of whether remote cyber espionage could reach a par-
ticular threshold of severity and, thereby, violate the sovereignty of the tar-
geted state.142  In a hypothetical provided by the Experts, a state remotely 
accesses another state’s military or intelligence cyber systems and exfiltrates 
significant amounts of highly classified data over an extended period of 
time.143  The majority of Experts believed that the exfiltration did not violate 
the targeted state’s sovereignty and, what is more, the legal issue was not one 
of severity but of the method employed.144  Interestingly, a few of the Experts 
were of the opinion that if the consequences suffered by the cyber espionage 
were so severe—if large amounts of classified data were exfiltrated over a 
long period, for example—it would amount to a violation of sovereignty re-
gardless of the method used.145  Under this sovereignty approach, important 
factors would include whether computer systems were damaged or de-
stroyed—not the nature, quality, or quantity of information purloined.146 
On the other hand, if a remote cyber espionage operation results in a 
loss of functionality within a state’s digital infrastructure, the Experts agreed 
that it may constitute a violation of that state’s sovereignty.147  This is true 
regardless of whether the infrastructure is owned by the country itself or pri-
vate industry.148  This finding is in line, generally, with Tallinn 2.0’s guide-
lines regarding sovereignty in the context of any type of cyber operation.149  
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It remains unclear, however, the exact threshold needed to constitute a viola-
tion of sovereignty in this way.150  According to the Experts, a cyber opera-
tion that necessitates repair to physical components of the digital infrastruc-
ture amounts to a violation.151  However, no consensus was reached as to 
whether a breach of sovereignty has occurred when an operation merely ne-
cessitates reinstallation of a computer operating system, for example.152  Fur-
ther, the Experts could not reach a consensus on cyber espionage operations 
that install “backdoors” to access data, cause cyber programs to operate in a 
different manner, or activities which alter or delete data stored within the 
cyber infrastructure.153  Legal nuances surrounding the effects of various 
means of digital espionage remain uncertain. 
B.  Non-Intervention 
In addition to sovereignty, customary international law also establishes 
the principle of non-intervention—that is, a state must not interfere in the 
affairs of another state.154  Violation of this principle requires the offending 
state, or individual acting at the behest of that state, to act coercively in the 
internal or external affairs of the victim state.155  The Experts paid consider-
able attention to the issue of state non-intervention in regards to cyber oper-
ations.156  For the specific issue of cyber espionage, they were of the opinion 
that it does not qualify per se as intervention, as it is not necessarily coercive 
in nature.157  However, certain activities within the realm of cyber espionage 
may rise to the level of state intervention.  For example, the majority of Ex-
perts posited that in the event one state gained access to another state’s gov-
ernment computer system, accessed sensitive domestic intelligence data, and 
then made such records public, that activity could constitute unlawful inter-
vention if the goal was to alter an internal political debate over the victim 
state’s surveillance practices.158  On the other hand, mere intrusion into a for-
eign nation’s cyber infrastructure, which necessitates breaching cyber barri-
ers—including overcoming firewalls or password protection—would be in-
adequate to qualify as intervention.159 
Unfortunately, Tallinn 2.0 gives little attention to the possibility of eco-
nomically-oriented espionage, including theft of trade secrets and intellectual 
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property, which may rise to the level of intervention.160  Indeed, it is likely 
that economic and industrial espionage pose a particularly vexing problem in 
terms of intervention, as these activities are likely to financially disadvantage 
the victim state and ultimately impact that state’s economic and trade poli-
cies.161  Significant ambiguity persists regarding this issue. 
C.  Non-State Actors and Due Diligence 
The legal category of “espionage” presupposes conduct by a state agent 
or a person acting under the direction of a state.  The theft of government or 
industry secrets by individuals acting in a private capacity is just that: theft.  
Likewise, non-state actors hacking into foreign government or corporate net-
work does not constitute espionage, but it is commonly proscribed by domes-
tic law.162  The international law precept of due diligence, however, requires 
states to ensure that their own territory and other objects163 over which they 
have control are not used in a way that harms other states.164  Does this prin-
ciple require states, in the absence of a treaty agreement on point, to end the 
digital theft by domestic non-state actors when their conduct harms foreign 
nations?  In the view of the Experts, states may violate the principle of due 
diligence if domestic non-state actors conduct operations which result in se-
rious adverse consequences and affect the rights of a target state.165  The exact 
threshold of “serious adverse consequence[]” is unsettled in international 
law166and poses a challenging issue in the arena of cyber hacking.  The Ex-
perts agreed that cyber operations that result in a major impact to a state’s 
economy, or one that severely disrupts government functions or business, 
may be sufficient to trigger the rule.167 
The Experts were careful to specify, however, that the precept of due 
diligence is only implicated when a non-state actor engages in an activity 
that, if done by the territorial state, would breach an international legal obli-
gation, such as violating sovereignty or would constitute intervention.168  
Thus, digital intelligence gathering by non-state actors may be a violation of 
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domestic law, but in itself does not trigger the due diligence rule absent spe-
cific unlawful activity.  Like state espionage, digital intrusions by non-state 
actors only run afoul of international law when specific conduct violates 
other international legal provisions.  In that case, the territorial state has the 
obligation to take feasible measures to end the offending cyber operation.169 
D.  Right to Privacy 
Customary international law also restricts states in terms of affirmative 
human rights guarantees.170  Importantly for this discussion, the Experts 
opined that the status of economic rights is unclear as a matter of customary 
law.171  Instead, such rights are subject to the provisions of state treaty com-
mitments.172  The right to privacy, however, is more established.  Cyber es-
pionage activities may implicate the right to individual privacy, although es-
pionage itself does not per se violate the rule.173  The Experts agreed that the 
right to privacy is one guaranteed by customary international law, but that its 
scope is not well-defined.174  The legality of examining the content of elec-
tronic communications, particularly, is complicated by whether such data 
was inspected by humans or machines.175  The Experts agreed that the col-
lection of personal data of individuals did implicate this right—although they 
were unable to agree on a definition of “personal data.”176  Collection of 
metadata may violate this rule if it is later linked to an individual and has a 
nexus to that individual’s private life.177  Notably, the right to privacy is not 
absolute and may be subject to some limitations, including national security 
justifications.178 
The Experts cautioned, however, that the application of this body of law 
is significantly limited by territorial concerns.179  The majority agreed that 
customary international human rights law applies to persons within a state’s 
territory as well as within the physical territory where that state exercises 
“power or effective control.”180  The Experts could not reach a consensus on 
whether state cyber activities could constitute such power or effective control 
over territory or persons as opposed to physical power or control, triggering 
the applicability of this customary rule—although the majority rejected this 
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contention.181  The majority believed that physical control over territory or 
an individual person was necessary to trigger international human rights 
laws.182  In fact, the Experts noted a lack of evidence evincing an opinio juris 
that state intelligence-gathering activities directed at persons on foreign ter-
ritory triggered the international right to privacy.183  In other words, the right 
to privacy does not likely apply extraterritorially in most cases of interna-
tional digital spying.  This finding indicates that the current legal understand-
ing may not effectively limit foreign cyber intelligence collection by states. 
E.  Honeypots 
Another interesting cyber espionage issue raised by the Experts is that 
of a “weaponized” honeypot.  These devices may be used by states to deter 
and punish foreign cyber espionage attempts.  Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines a 
honeypot as a deception technique to defend a computer system against ma-
licious operations that use a physical or virtual environment designed to lure 
the attention of intruders with the aim of deceiving the intruders about the 
nature of the environment.184  Honeypots can be created for the purpose of 
wasting intruder resources, for gathering counter-intelligence information 
about the intruder’s intent, and for identifying the individual’s means and 
methods of cyber operations.185  A weaponized honeypot is one that contains 
files that, once exfiltrated, will cause significant disruption and damage to 
the intruder’s own cyber system.186  Again, the Experts were divided in terms 
of how international law applies to this twist to cyber espionage.187  A mi-
nority of Experts opined that the state that created the honeypot, at least, vi-
olated the sovereignty of the intruding state.  Their theory was that the state 
that created the honeypot set in motion the events and are, therefore, respon-
sible under the law of state responsibility for an internationally wrongful 
act.188  The majority saw this issue rather differently.  They believed that the 
intruding state factually transmitted the weaponized files into their own cyber 
infrastructure.  As such, the state that created the honeypot and laid the trap 
did not, in fact, conduct the actual activity that caused the harm.189 
In sum, although peacetime cyber espionage by states is not a per se 
violation of international law, it is inextricably linked and intertwined with 
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other internationally prohibited conduct.  The legality of peacetime cyber es-
pionage operations is dependent upon the specific conduct used to accom-
plish the act of espionage—in other words, whether specific activities asso-
ciated with the espionage violate some norm of international law.  The 
unsettled limits of these provisions raise serious concerns about the current 
state of the law. 
F.  Application in Times of Conflict 
The Tallinn 2.0 legal framework for wartime cyber espionage differs 
substantially from the preceding analysis.  Rather than providing a possible 
legal basis for declaring particular cyber espionage operation unlawful, it 
closely tracks the existing law as applied to the status of spies during war-
time.190  In other words, the framework is primarily about the status of cap-
tured personnel, rather than the legality of state conduct.  Because they are 
grounded on geographic location and the spy’s return to their military as a 
key trigger to immunity, the existing rules do not translate well to the digital 
context.  This Section will examine Tallinn 2.0’s cyber espionage rules in 
wartime, noting the incongruities that render this law difficult to apply.  The 
gaps, ambiguities, and limitations of cyber espionage in the context of armed 
conflict are largely a function of a discord between traditional notions of spy-
ing in warfare and the realities of cyber espionage. 
The primary mismatch is the geographical limitation trigger for spying 
under the law of armed conflict.  For example, Hague Regulation Article 29 
specifies that the spy must obtain or endeavor to obtain information “in the 
zone of operations of a belligerent.”191  Similarly, Article 46 of Additional 
Protocol I uses somewhat comparable language: “[T]erritory controlled by 
an adverse Party” to convey a similar idea.192  Because the aim of the Experts 
in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is to state the lex lata, Rule 89 appropriately incor-
porates the geographical limitation by specifying “who has engaged in cyber 
espionage in enemy-controlled territory.”193  The Experts were also careful 
to note that cyber espionage performed from outside enemy territory does not 
violate Rule 89.194  The geographical limitation trigger for wartime cyber es-
pionage is problematic and somewhat anachronistic when applied to cyber 
espionage.  One of the primary features and benefits of cyber operations gen-
erally, and cyber espionage specifically, is the ability to operate remotely.  To 
gather intelligence and other information, cyber spies can and do operate 
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from virtually anywhere.  Aside from speed and anonymity, having the abil-
ity to act remotely and achieve the same effects is one of the game-changing 
advantages of using digital means. 
Cyber capabilities may lessen the need to employ human resources on 
the ground in conflict zones.  One of the last places a cyber spy would want 
to be is in enemy territory.  The Experts acknowledged that given the geo-
graphical limitation to enemy-controlled territory, cyber spying would most 
likely occur as a so-called “close access cyber operation,” which requires 
physical proximity to the targeted system.195  The example provided by the 
Experts involved a member of the armed forces using a flash drive to access 
a computer system or intercepting signals while acting clandestinely.196  To 
the extent that a spy is doing a close access cyber operation or intercepting 
signals, the cyber aspect of the espionage mission is not particularly unique 
or dispositive relative to other types of spying activities.  Put in a slightly 
different way, the close access operation is just another way of gathering in-
telligence, analogous to taking pictures, drawing maps, or stealing docu-
ments.  It lacks some of the defining and most important characteristics of 
the pertinent digital context. 
A second, and related, mismatch involves the requirement that the act 
of espionage must be carried out “clandestinely or under false pretences.”197  
To provide clarity to the meaning of the “clandestinely or under false pre-
tences,” the Experts explained: 
“Clandestinely” refers to activities undertaken secretly or secre-
tively, as with a cyber espionage operation designed to conceal the 
identity of the persons involved or the fact that it has occurred.  An 
act of cyber information collection is “under false pretences” when 
conducted so as to create the impression that the individual con-
cerned is entitled to access the information in question.198 
It is somewhat obvious that acting “clandestinely or under false pre-
tences” in the real world is a rather different situation than in a virtual one.  
This can be seen with three hypothetical situations.  In the first hypothetical, 
a combatant, operating behind enemy lines, takes off their uniform and dons 
civilian clothing to facilitate sneaking into enemy headquarters with a flash 
drive to steal plans from the enemy’s computer system.  This hypothetical 
represents a clear case of spying under the law of armed conflict.  Upon cap-
ture, the combatant has lost their combatant immunity and POW status and 
can be prosecuted under the domestic criminal law of the enemy state.  In the 
second hypothetical, the only difference is the combatant neither takes off 
their uniform nor puts on civilian clothes.  In this case, upon almost certain 
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 196.  Id.   
 197.  Id. at 168.   
 198.  Id. at 410 (footnotes omitted). 
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capture in the headquarters, the combatant is not a spy and retains combatant 
immunity and POW status.  In the third hypothetical, the combatant, while 
operating behind enemy lines, continues to wear their uniform.  The combat-
ant is a computer specialist attempting to intercept enemy signals messages.  
While online, they act anonymously to steal enemy passwords that give them 
access to classified enemy communications.  The combatant is captured by 
the enemy while still wearing their uniform and before they rejoin their army. 
The third hypothetical is somewhat problematic because, in the real 
world, the combatant did not act “clandestinely or under false pretences.”  
They continued to wear a uniform to distinguish themselves as a combatant.  
In cyberspace, they absolutely acted secretly or secretively to conceal their 
identity during this mission to intercept enemy signals.  Moreover, by steal-
ing the enemy’s passwords, they created the impression that they were enti-
tled to access to the enemy’s network and information.  Given those facts, is 
the combatant now a spy subject to prosecution, even though, to the outside 
world, they appeared to be a combatant for the duration of the operation? 
Complicating the third hypothetical further is the concept of ruses under 
the law of armed conflict.  Ruses are acts intended to mislead an adversary 
or to induce them to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of the law of 
armed conflict.199  Examples of ruses in armed conflict are “the use of cam-
ouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.”200  Tallinn Manual 
2.0, Rule 123, provides examples of permissible ruses in cyberspace, includ-
ing using false computer identifiers, networks, and transmissions, as well as 
enemy codes, signals, and passwords.201  The third scenario represents an 
important, but blurry, intersection between the rules regarding spying and 
ruses.  Given the facts in the third hypothetical, it is very difficult to conclude 
such conduct would amount to spying under Rule 89. 
A final issue that divided the Experts involved the nature of the infor-
mation collected.  The majority of the Experts believed that the nature of the 
information collected has no bearing on the characterization of the activities 
as cyber espionage.202  The only stipulation was that it had to be collected on 
behalf of a party to the international armed conflict.203  Alternatively, the mi-
nority thought that the information involved must have some military 
value.204  This lack of consensus among the Experts further muddies the wa-
ter of the legal parameters of espionage during wartime. 
While reflecting on the lex lata of espionage, the Experts’ formulation 
unfortunately does not effectively address several unique problems raised by 
                                                          
 199.  Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 37(2). 
 200.  Id.  
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the realities of the digital environment.  Particularly, Tallinn 2.0’s discussion 
of wartime espionage is inapposite to the current developments, as it heavily 
relies on the aforementioned “behind enemy lines” nexus.  The next Part of 
this Article considers these dynamics and proposes a path ahead for the lex 
ferenda as states begin to substantively grapple with the current state of the 
law. 
V.  THE ROAD AHEAD: THE LEX FERENDA 
A.  Political and Military-Based Cyber Espionage 
Considerable ambiguity continues to exist regarding the legal limits of 
cyber espionage, both in peacetime and during conflict, after Tallinn 2.0.  Im-
portantly, however, traditional methods of espionage have always existed in 
a relative “black hole” of legality—domestically, but not internationally, pro-
scribed and widely practiced.205  The current legal framework for cyber espi-
onage offers wide leeway and interpretive flexibility for states.  In the ab-
sence of voluntary change in practice, international agreement, or emerging 
legal custom, states will likely continue to comfortably operate within the 
uncertain sphere of cyber espionage, conducting intelligence-gathering oper-
ations against foreign nations, institutions, and individuals.  In particular, na-
tions will continue foreign digital spying in order to gain military and politi-
cal advantages, and to maintain national interests and security.  This conduct 
is strongly rooted in history, and nations continue to have powerful justifica-
tions for widespread intelligence collection in the modern day.206 
Indeed, there exist few intrinsic disincentives to cease these long-prac-
ticed activities.207  In fact, cyber capabilities have somewhat mitigated the 
risk for state-sponsored spies in terms of potential for capture.  Further, at-
tribution problems in cyber operations make it difficult for states to ensure 
                                                          
 205.  See supra Part II. 
 206.  See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Officials: Surveillance Programs Foiled More Than 50 Ter-
rorist Plots, WASH. POST (June 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-secu-
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thwarted more than fifty incidents of terrorism).   
 207.  Conversely, some scholars have theorized that states should have strong intrinsic interests 
in solidifying the rules of state-sanctioned espionage even in security-related intelligence gathering, 
apart from political pressures.  Most convincingly, clear legal guidelines would facilitate intelli-
gence sharing between allies where one state has been previously restricted in doing so by domestic 
legal concerns over the second state’s surveillance activities.  See Deeks, supra note 3, at 315–16 
(noting particularly condemnation of surveillance practices carried out by the United States and the 
United Kingdom).  Additionally, states would benefit by tighter control of foreign surveillance over 
their own citizens.  Id. at 326.  At least one head of state, for example, has expressed the view that 
multiple practices involved in cyber intelligence gathering, such as foreign electronic surveillance, 
violate international law.  U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 5th plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.5 (Sept. 
24, 2013). 
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foreign compliance with any future international agreements, reducing the 
benefit of entering into arrangements that would limit their own intelligence-
gathering operations.208  Additionally, states and corporations will continue 
to be subject to malevolent cyber intrusions from private entities—both for-
eign and domestic—necessitating major investments in cyber security re-
gardless of existing international agreements that limit state conduct.  There-
fore, despite major gaps and mismatches in the existing legal framework, 
nations generally lack robust motivations to close them.  Political influences, 
however, including public opposition from citizens, humanitarian groups, 
and foreign leaders may effectively curb some of the most concerning state 
practices.209 
Internal and external political pressures can result in changes to domes-
tic law and policy.  So-called “naming and shaming” has been influential in 
the modification of the U.S. government’s own surveillance policies, for ex-
ample, after it faced enormous public backlash at home and abroad in the 
wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures.210  Electronic surveillance practices 
may be uniquely susceptible as the target of grassroots “naming and sham-
ing” campaigns because they directly implicate the privacy of individuals.211  
Traditional methods of espionage, on the other hand, rarely reached far into 
the private sphere.212  Although the Experts stated that the international cus-
tomary right to privacy was not effectively implicated due to the extraterrito-
rial nature of foreign cyber espionage, states will likely be subject to consid-
erable public pressure to limit these activities even in the absence of 
applicable law on point.213  Additional influences from corporations who risk 
losing business due to state surveillance practices that infringe upon privacy 
may also spur domestic change.214 
                                                          
 208.  Indeed, the advent of cyber capabilities may exacerbate this long-standing source of state 
reluctance to adopt espionage-limiting agreements.  See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.  
See generally William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions after Tallinn 
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 209.  Deeks, supra note 73, at 635–36.   
 210.  See Sarah Childress, How the NSA Spying Programs Have Changed Since Snowden, 
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Concerning espionage conducted for the purposes of accessing foreign 
state political and military secrets, then, country practices will ultimately be 
limited by a combination of legal interpretation and policy objectives—them-
selves shaped by diplomatic concerns and internal political factors.  These 
same pressures may eventually persuade states to enter into multilateral 
agreements restricting some offensive forms of cyber espionage by the major 
world players—particularly those practices that most infringe on privacy—
but that possibility seems remote at the present time.215  States may instead 
agree to limit espionage in this realm with strategic partners, as these agree-
ments may be in the best interests of states and tend to bolster collective na-
tional security frameworks.216 
                                                          
 215.  See infra note 270 and accompanying text.  Existing treaty laws do, to some extent, cir-
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Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 81, 133 (2015); see also Deeks, supra note 3, at 305–06.  Such difference in 
interpretation may result in disparate legal analyses on issues such as bulk intelligence gathering 
against individuals.  Deeks, supra note 3, at 306.  Most problematically, there is little consensus 
among scholars whether the ICCPR applies extraterritorially, thus limiting foreign surveillance ac-
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United States, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014), https://un-
docs.org/CCPR/C/USA/CO/4.  It is the UN’s position, then, that it does apply extraterritorially.  
Short of a treaty amendment, this jurisdictional hurdle makes the ICCPR inadequate to address the 
most pervasive and troubling, at least to states, forms of surveillance—those happening across in-
ternational borders.   
 216.  For example, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—
the so-called “Five Eyes”—established a pact to refrain from spying on one another.  See Margaret 
Warner, An Exclusive Club: The Five Countries That Don’t Spy on Each Other, PBS (Oct. 25, 
2013), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/an-exclusive-club-the-five-countries-that-dont-spy-
on-each-other.  
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B.  Espionage in Wartime 
The object of much less public attention, rules regarding wartime espi-
onage are unlikely to face political pressure of the nature described above.  
Importantly, gaps in wartime cyber espionage discussed in the previous Part 
do not seem to expose particularly pressing matters in the international legal 
order.  That is, although the rules are quite limited in application, and do not 
fit well with the realities of most cyber operations, they do not pose especially 
disturbing concerns for military leaders.  Espionage in wartime is primarily 
an issue of personnel status—whether a captured spy will receive formal 
POW treatment and immunity from prosecution—rather than a restriction on 
state conduct.  In reality, the capture of an enemy cyber spy, whether territo-
rially or extraterritorially, will likely be a remote possibility.  Further, the 
issue of personnel classification is relatively untroubling in most cases, as the 
policy of many nations is to give “POW-like” status to all detainees, regard-
less of actual technical status.217  Additionally, the rules regarding wartime 
cyber spying, as in traditional wartime spying, are only applicable in interna-
tional armed conflicts, not the more common non-international armed con-
flicts that primarily exist globally today.218  As a result, it is unlikely that 
states will advocate for adjusting this legal regime in the near future.  It may 
be possible that wartime cyber espionage will be addressed as part of a com-
prehensive legal agreement, should there be sufficient pressure to produce a 
multilateral treaty addressing the many problems endemic to the application 
of conventional laws of armed conflict to cyber warfare.219  In the interim, 
much like other law of war matters, one should expect that the legal frame-
work will evolve in response to discrete issues as they arise. 
C.  The Unique Case of Cyber Economic Espionage 
Economic and industry-based cyber espionage, on the other hand, have 
emerged as a uniquely problematic practice on the international stage.  For 
many states, economic cyber espionage is unacceptably laden with risk, of-
fers limited value,220 and is less predictable and domestically controllable 
                                                          
 217.  See generally Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
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than traditional espionage for the purpose of national security.221  Numerous 
countries have begun to seek both domestic and international solutions to this 
issue. 
Worldwide, government officials have taken strong positions against 
commercial spying.222  Based on this emerging sentiment, states may agree 
to distinguish traditional economic intelligence gathering from all other kinds 
and regulate breaches through multilateral treaties.223  In practical terms, the 
content of agreements and likelihood of compliance will be rooted in the rel-
ative interests, risks, and incentives facing individual states.224  Based on this 
assumption, it seems unlikely that the major players in international cyber 
espionage, including the United States, United Kingdom, China, and Russia, 
would unanimously agree to a comprehensive set of limitations.225  One ra-
ther surprising development in this area, however, is the 2015 cyber agree-
ment between the United States and China.  In an effort to stem the tide of 
pernicious cyber espionage, both governments agreed that neither would sup-
port nor conduct cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.226  China repli-
cated these efforts with both Canada and the United Kingdom.227  Given the 
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tury, GOV.UK (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement-
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magnitude and length of China’s pattern of cyber espionage abuses, however, 
it is easy to be skeptical of these agreements.228  Of note, diplomatic agree-
ments such as these may not be legally binding.229 
One challenge in regulating economic cyber espionage is drawing clear 
distinctions between permissible and impermissible conduct.230  For exam-
ple, collecting data regarding the private manufacture or flow of certain 
goods that may be used by a state’s military, such as aircraft or satellites, may 
be of both economic and national security consequence.  Likewise, infor-
mation about trade negotiations, a foreign state’s gold reserves, or plans to 
alter prevailing interest rates are also of strategic significance.231  It would be 
difficult to accurately define the parameters of acceptable data collection, 
since commercial information commonly does have some nexus to national 
security.  Nations could agree that although economic data may be collected, 
it must not be used to benefit or advantage domestic companies.  For exam-
ple, although the United States has consistently engaged in intelligence gath-
ering with a nexus to the activities of foreign businesses, including investi-
gating private industry corruption that impacts U.S. interests, it has also 
consistently reaffirmed that the information is not shared with private corpo-
rations for their financial benefit.232  Compliance with a distinction like this 
would understandably be complicated in states with strong ties between gov-
ernment and industry.  Assuming that a line could be agreed upon and de-
fined—by crafting limits based on the intent, purpose, or effect of economic 
intelligence gathering, for example233—there are numerous possible mecha-
nisms for international legal codification and enforcement. 
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It may be feasible to adapt existing international legal frameworks and 
forums for governing and adjudicating cyber espionage issues, such as 
through the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(“TRIPS”)234 and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).235  Parties to the 
TRIPS Agreement must protect against the wrongful acquisition, disclosure, 
or use of protected information, including proprietary trade secrets.236  The 
treaty does, however, allow for wide latitude on the part of states to create 
exceptions to domestic implementing legislation for actions deemed essential 
to the state’s own financial development, potentially allowing states to con-
tinue forms of economic espionage.237  Also, as interpreted by many today, 
TRIPS does not protect against economic espionage by foreign states.238  If 
amended to include instances of foreign economic espionage, cases could be 
adjudicated through the WTO’s existing Dispute Settlement Body.239  It is 
also possible, though unlikely, that the WTO could adjudicate cases of eco-
nomic espionage through other pertinent rules.240 
Other scholars suggest broadening the terms of the Cybercrime Conven-
tion to cover instances of international state-sponsored cyber espionage.241  
The Cybercrime Convention currently requires party states to enact domestic 
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legislation forbidding cyber theft.242  The Agreement does not, however, ef-
fectively limit state-sanctioned espionage.243  The Agreement also relies on 
domestic definitions of cybercrimes and does not definitively proscribe eco-
nomic espionage.244  Amendments could be made to incorporate a duty to 
criminalize the stealing of electronic information for the benefit of domestic 
corporations.245 
Running parallel to the rise in international public disapproval of eco-
nomic espionage, domestic prosecution efforts have also escalated.  United 
States federal laws proscribing espionage have been somewhat effective in 
addressing instances of foreign espionage—although, the effects may be 
more symbolic than practical.  The Economic Espionage Act,246 for example, 
was enacted to specifically address foreign economic espionage.247  The leg-
islation applies to actions committed by individuals for the benefit of foreign 
state powers and has been the basis of several indictments so far, including 
those charging Chinese military hackers accused of commercial data theft 
against U.S. corporations.248  In 2014, five members of Unit 61398 were in-
dicted and charged for hacking into the networks of Westinghouse Electric, 
the United States Steel Corporation, and other companies.249  Like other do-
mestic laws potentially regulating international cyber behavior, the legisla-
tion’s impact is limited due to issues in determining attribution of the cyber 
activities, ensuring extradition of defendants, and identifying proper judicial 
forums for cases.250  Indeed, the five Chinese hackers will likely never face 
trial for their actions because of extradition problems.251  Despite this fact, 
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the case was effective in sending a strong message of condemnation to the 
Chinese government, as the incident played an important role in prompting 
the bilateral cyber agreement with China.252  Further, public criminal prose-
cutions through domestic law may also play an important role in the devel-
opment of international norms in the area of cyber espionage.253 
The effectiveness of domestic legislation ultimately hinges on logistical 
considerations in bringing foreign actors to justice.  Mutual legal assistance 
and extradition treaties form the bedrock of international cooperation in pros-
ecuting defendants outside national borders.254  Some are fairly comprehen-
sive in the range of crimes that trigger state duties to cooperate in foreign 
prosecution of criminals and ostensibly include cyber-related incidents.255  
However, many lack meaningful enforcement obligations, as exemplified by 
Russia’s refusal to extradite Edward Snowden despite a U.S.-Russia mutual 
legal assistance treaty.256 Some also lack specificity regarding cyber 
crimes.257  These agreements could be strengthened by providing sanctions 
for states that do not comply with extradition guarantees and by amendments 
that clearly outline state obligations in the cyber arena. 
Given the significant jurisdictional issues with existing frameworks, bi-
lateral investment treaties (“BITs”) may present a more effective, if piece-
meal, approach to limit certain unwanted activities within state-sanctioned 
cyber espionage.  As noted above, domestic legislation—such as the Eco-
nomic Espionage Act, which criminalizes foreign state theft of trade se-
crets—is, in reality, limited in its effectiveness due to difficulties in deter-
mining attribution, extraditing defendants, and finding proper forums for 
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adjudication.258 BITs may be more efficient tools for dealing with these crim-
inal activities.  Such agreements would provide victim businesses with a legal 
avenue to pursue remedies against foreign states directly and a forum to do 
so.259  These instruments would also fix another endemic problem in frame-
works of domestic prosecution: harmonizing the applicable substantive 
law.260 
Based on the serious risks posed by modern industrial cyber espionage, 
and a lack of governing international law framework, many states have en-
acted internal legislation to mitigate threats to their own government and do-
mestic industries.  Some have passed data localization laws ensuring domes-
tic control over cyber infrastructure.  Kazakhstan, for example, requires new 
businesses to use internet servers physically located within the country.261  
Taiwanese law allows government authorities to restrict international trans-
fers of data based on national interests.262  Others have adopted policies re-
garding computer hardware or software.  In 2017, for example, President 
Trump signed a law purging Kaspersky antivirus software from U.S. govern-
ment computers over a concern of cyber espionage.263  These developments 
display the utility of state efforts to act protectively within their own borders 
in the absence of applicable comprehensive international legal framework 
providing remedies for security breaches. 
Finally, as states continue to make efforts to eradicate economic espio-
nage, this could lead to the development of customary international law.  The 
formation of customary law in this area, in fact, seems more probable than a 
consensus by the major world powers on a multilateral legal agreement.264  
As defined by the International Court of Justice, customary law requires that 
states generally and uniformly follow a certain practice, and those states be-
lieve that the practice is required by international law (also referred to as 
opinio juris).265  Unlike traditional forms of espionage which rarely resulted 
in states publicly rebuking foreign governments—instead, quietly expelling 
or prosecuting the spy involved—modern cases involving economic espio-
nage show the opposite trend.266  Current events indicate that states are be-
coming more willing to draw a distinction between economic and other forms 
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of espionage.267  In addition to the multiple bilateral agreements involving 
China, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, G-20268 leaders 
agreed in 2015 to refrain from conducting espionage for financial benefit.269  
This general trend toward international consensus is not without exception, 
however.  In June 2017, after years of making progress toward the establish-
ment of comprehensive cyber norms, discussions at the United Nations ended 
in deadlock.270  Despite this recent setback, an international custom may 
emerge as states continue to affirm individual commitments to refrain from 
economic espionage and those commitments are solidified into legally-bind-
ing agreements. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The nature of espionage to date generally required a person to place 
themselves at risk by physically traveling into a hostile country—in peace-
time or wartime—to obtain the information being sought.  Because states 
were able to substantively prohibit espionage within their sovereign borders 
or within their zone of military operations, they could meaningfully police 
activities within their jurisdiction yet continue to engage in espionage opera-
tions abroad.  Cyber espionage fundamentally altered this equation and up-
ended the accompanying risk analysis. No longer does a spy have to cross 
into hostile territory to obtain the desired information—it can be done from 
the comfort of a desk with a computer workstation.  Moreover, states have 
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lost much direct control over espionage targeting domestic industry, as the 
data and digital infrastructure is privately owned and cyber intrusion requires 
neither a government entry visa nor diplomatic papers.  Meanwhile, the ef-
fects of intellectual property and proprietary theft on private corporations is 
felt quite strongly at the national level and poses a distinct threat of national 
economic harm.  The current international law framework for espionage, 
however, is ultimately rooted in traditional methods of spying—developed in 
the absence of this unique digital environment. 
Tallinn 2.0 has accomplished a great deal to assist states in dealing with 
the issue of cyber espionage.  By comprehensively documenting the lex lata, 
the Experts have made it possible to focus on the developments of cyber es-
pionage in relation to the current international law framework and expose its 
ensuing flaws.  The process of international law development via customary 
law and treaty can be interminably slow, and developments in technology 
generally outpace the development of international law.  As the Tallinn 2.0 
framework is substantially based on traditional rules regarding espionage, 
there understandably exist many areas of uncertainty.  The legal thresholds 
and parameters regarding the violation of sovereignty and intervention, for 
example, remain particularly unclear.  The limits of the state duty of due dil-
igence in preventing actions of non-state actors also seem opaque.  Ambigu-
ity still exists as to the applicability of the right to privacy and the extent to 
which it may restrict state cyber spying.  Most obviously, the rules as applied 
to wartime seem to be especially unhelpful and inapplicable, as they are tied 
to espionage taking place within the geographic territory of the victim state. 
Despite these uncertainties in the lex lata, most states are unlikely to 
insist on more concrete guidelines within the field of cyber spying for politi-
cal and military secrets.  Espionage itself has traditionally existed in a nebu-
lous legal status, and nations have comfortably operated within this sphere 
both in peacetime and during conflict.  Advances in digital technology have 
no doubt altered the playing field of state-on-state espionage, but nations still 
lack strong incentives to curb most cyber intelligence gathering through le-
gally binding agreements.  While governments, institutions, and individuals 
may have to resign themselves to the continuing ubiquity of cyber spying for 
national security and military purposes, the tide may be turning in the specific 
case of economic espionage.  Economic espionage poses a particularly risk-
laden and unmanageable threat to states, and world leaders have increasingly 
publicized their opposition to the practice.  States, in fact, face a multitude of 
options to meaningfully limit incidents of economic-based espionage in the 
future. 
